Abstract-Security is a fundamental prerequisite for network survivability and reliability in mobile ad hoc networks (MANET). In the presence of selfish nodes that disobey the standard, the performance of well-behaved nodes will significantly degrade. In this paper, we focus on identifying potential threats in medium access control (MAC) layer introduced by selfish nodes, especially "smart" attack strategies that can defeat the existing detection and reaction systems against MAC layer selfish misbehavior. Furthermore, we propose Predictable Random Backoff (PRB) algorithm that is capable of mitigating the impact of these vulnerabilities. PRB is based on minor modification of IEEE 802.11 binary exponential backoff (BEB) and forces each node to generate "predictable" random backoff intervals. Via computer simulations, we show that PRB is fairly efficient in ensuring reasonable throughput for well-behaved flows in the presence of selfish flows.
I. INTRODUCTION
Reliable communication in ad hoc networks depends on the inherent trust among nodes. Clearly, trust means nodes need to fully cooperate with each other to ensure correct routing establishment mechanisms, the protection of routing information and the security of packet forwarding [13] . However, this trust might be abused by adversaries to carry out security breaches through compromised nodes. The traditional approach to provide network security is built on cryptographybased authentication. However, this is not sufficient to solve the problems arising from new node misbehaviors in mobile ad hoc networks (MANET). Hence, securing MANET against MAC layer misbehavior has become a major challenge in the research community.
Host misbehaviors in MANET can be classified into two categories; namely, selfish misbehavior [7] , [11] and malicious misbehavior [2] , [8] , [9] . A selfish host can deliberately misuse the MAC protocol to gain more network resources than wellbehaved hosts. The node can benefit from this behavior by: (1) obtaining a large portion of channel capacity (hence improved throughput); (2) reduced power consumption; (3) improved quality of service, e.g. low network latency. For example, IEEE 802.11 requires hosts competing for the channel to wait for backoff interval [11] before any transmissions. A selfish host may choose to wait for a smaller backoff interval, thereby increasing its chance of accessing the channel and hence reducing the throughput share received by well-behaved stations. The authors of [11] showed that such selfish misbehavior can seriously degrade the performance of the network and accordingly they proposed some modifications for the protocol (e.g., by allowing the receiver to assign backoff values rather than the sender) to detect and penalize misbehaving nodes. Similarly, the authors of [15] addressed the same problem and proposed a system, DOMINO, to detect greedy misbehavior such as backoff manipulations in IEEE 802.11.
Alternatively, malicious misbehavior aims primarily at disrupting the normal operation of the network. This includes colluding adversaries that continuously send data to each other in order to deplete the channel capacity in their vicinity (i.e., causing a denial of service attack, DoS) and hence prevent other legitimate users from communicating [16] . A new class of vulnerabilities was presented in [7] where a host could maliciously modify the protocol timeout mechanism (e.g. by changing SIFS parameter in IEEE 802.11 [1] ) and force MAC frames to be dropped at well-behaved nodes. A host exploiting this vulnerability will completely cooperate in forwarding data packets but maliciously forces the forwarding operation to fail. Moreover, the attack also targets crossing flows (flows that traverse through a malicious node) by disrupting their communication and forcing the routing protocol to reroute packets around the misbehaved node.
In this paper, we present a series of new selfish attack strategies against the existing detection and reaction systems as well as IEEE 802.11 standard. Moreover, we propose Predictable Random Backoff (PRB) algorithm to mitigate the selfish MAC misbehavior. The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Section II presents an overview of related work. Section III elaborates the selfish attack strategies. Section IV illustrates the procedure of our proposed algorithm PRB. Section V evaluates the efficiency of PRB through simulation experiments. Finally, conclusions and future work are presented in section VI.
II. RELATED WORK
The IEEE 802.11 Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) mode [1] combines Carrier Sense Multiple Access/Collision Avoidance (CSMA/CA) with a Request to Send/Clear to Send (RTS/CTS) handshake to avoid collisions (as shown in Fig. 1 ). It works as follows: when a node has a packet to transmit, if the node senses the medium idle for a period of time longer than or equal to a Distributed Inter Frame Space (DIFS), the packet transmission may begin at the beginning of the immediately following slot. Otherwise, the node should backoff for a certain period based on a value randomly selected from [0, CW ], where CW is the contention window size. Upon successful contention for the channel, the node requests the channel by sending a RTS to the receiver which, in turn, replies with a CTS. The nodes in the vicinity overhearing the RTS or CTS defer their own transmission for a period that is long enough for the subsequent DATA/ACK exchange. When the RTS/CTS handshake is completed, the sender commences data transmission. The receiver acknowledges the data with an ACK. If no CTS or ACK is received, the sender exponentially backs off, and retransmits the RTS or the DATA. Since the number of transmission retries is bounded by ssrc (station short-frame retry counter) and slrc (station long-frame retry counter), a packet must be dropped after limited retries.
DCF is designed under the assumption that all participating nodes are well behaved. While well-behaved nodes strictly obey the protocol operation, the misbehaving nodes may deviate from the standard to either cause unfairness problems or disrupt the network services. This misbehavior may be hard to differentiate from some normal cases. For example, when a node selects a smaller contention window, it is hard to distinguish whether this is due to an intentional choice or a random selection.
Currently, several techniques have been proposed to detect and react to the backoff manipulation by selfish hosts. The authors of [15] presented a detection system (DOMINO) that does not require any modification to the MAC protocol and they presented several procedures for detecting misbehaviors that aim at altering protocol parameters (e.g., shorter than DIFS, oversized NAV, and backoff manipulation). The system is implemented at the AP (access point) and the AP is assumed to be trusted; traffic traces of sending hosts are collected periodically during short intervals of time called monitoring periods. This gathered data is then passed to six tests within the DOMINO algorithm. Each of these tests corresponds to a designated misbehavior (e.g., Backoff manipulation, oversized NAV, etc.). The result of each test is then fed into a check procedure, which in turn will infer whether a particular station is misbehaving or not. A node misbehaves when its corresponding cheat counter exceeds a certain threshold (i.e., to reduce the false positives). Misbehaving nodes are then punished using a punishing function. For further details, the reader is referred to [15] .
On the other hand, the authors of [11] proposed modifications to 802.11 for facilitating the detection of misbehaving nodes. Here, the receiver assigns backoff values to the sender and monitors the sender for any potential misbehavior; in case of misbehavior, the receiver penalizes the sender by increasing its backoff values for next transmissions. If the sender deviates repeatedly, then it is considered as misbehaving and appropriate measures are taken in order to isolate the host. One drawback for this approach in ad hoc networks (as opposed to infrastructure-based wireless networks) is that hosts may not be trusted and hence a receiver itself may misbehave by assigning different backoff values to different senders (colluding attack) or by overhearing neighboring transmissions and selecting appropriate backoff values to cause collisions. The authors of [4] highlighted these issues and proposed extensions for the detection system of [11] under the assumption that at least one of the parties involved is honest. Their approach follows that of [11] ; however, both sender and receiver will exchange some additional commitment information to ensure complete randomness and to verify that none of the hosts is misbehaving prior to the assignment. Any detected misbehavior (whether from the receiver or the sender) is reported to a reputation management system. Furthermore, the authors of [4] highlighted the MAC selfish misbehavior and proposed extensions for the detection system of [11] under the assumption that at least one of the parties involved is honest. Their approach follows that of [11] wherein the receiver assigns a backoff value for the sender; however, both sender and receiver will exchange some additional commitment information to ensure complete randomness and to verify that none of the hosts is misbehaving prior to the assignment. Any detected misbehavior (whether from the receiver or the sender) is reported to a reputation management system.
III. ATTACK STRATEGY

A. Classification of Attacks
We classify the attacks based on their knowledge about the existing intrusion prevention systems (IPS), intrusion detection systems (IDS) and intrusion reaction systems (IRS):
• Naive Attack: a misbehaved node has no knowledge of the IPS or IDS or IRS and implements simple attacks to achieve a selfish goal, e.g., improving throughput or conserving energy.
• Smart Attack: a node knows the complete operation procedure of the IPS, IDS and IRS, however, it might not be capable of guessing the exact critical parameters, such as monitoring interval T and threshold T hresh as used in [11] and [15] . Therefore, the selfish node will (a) After overhearing the backoff assigned by 2 to 1, B assigns a specific backoff to A such that when A starts to transmit it will cause frame reception corrupted at node 2. misbehave in a way, as mentioned later, in which it can act selfishly whereas reducing the possibility to be easily detected.
B. Analysis of Vulnerabilities
We identify some potential vulnerabilities that do not rely on the security weakness 1 and can be implemented much easier and more efficient.
Naive Attack: Here a node will always select a backoff value from a different distribution with a smaller average backoff value than the distribution specified by the DCF, e.g.
or not doubling its CW when collision happens [11] . In [15] , the authors have addressed two techniques: 1) selectively scramble MAC frames sent by other stations in order to force them to backoff for longer duration; 2) manipulate MAC parameters, such as choosing smaller DIFS or increasing NAV value or backoffing for a shorter period (same as [11] ). These attacks can cause significant unfair share of bandwidth, however, they are easily exposed under the systems described in [11] , [15] .
Smart Attack: The techniques implemented by naive attackers such as always selecting smaller cw or setting longer NAV could lead to easy detection. We present several types of potential threats exploiting the IEEE 802.11 as well as the existing detection and reaction systems against selfish misbehavior.
1) Untrusted Partners:
A successful data transmission relies on the full cooperation of both the transmitter (Tx) 3 and the receiver (Rx). As we mentioned earlier, in [11] the Tx selects the first cw 1 and the Rx will assign the rest of the cw i according to the deviation of the Tx. This scheme is designed under the assumption that the receiver is trusted; however, in MANET this might not be the case. A misbehaved Rx can assign a larger backoff to a well-behaved node or a smaller backoff to a colluding node. Furthermore, the Rx can intentionally assign a specific backoff to the Tx to cause failed transmission (see Fig. 2(a) ) or a delayed transmission (see Fig. 2(b) ) 4 . Although the Tx might be able to detect the deviation of Rx, it has no direct evidence to judge the Tx as a misbehaved node. Moreover, protecting the assigned backoff with encryption can partially prevent such attacks, however, it will introduce non-trivial processing delay and additional communication overhead. The method proposed in [4] requires both the Tx and Rx to select a random number (cw T x and cw Rx ) and XOR these two values to compute the next cw next assigned to Tx, i.e., cw next = cw T x ⊕ cw Rx . A misbehaved Rx can choose a specific number cw Rx to calculate a desired cw next , e.g., a larger value assigned to well-behaved node. For example, the Tx chooses cw T x = 8 oct = (1000) bin whereas the Rx chooses cw Rx = 8 oct . Consequently, Tx gets cw next = 0. Rx can also assign a large backoff to Tx in a similar way. Moreover, in [4] , [11] , the Tx and the Rx can collude with each other to create denial of service attack, e.g., the Rx always gives Tx a smaller backoff value (e.g., 0), which can completely deplete the channel capacity in the vicinity of either the Tx or the Rx.
2) Adaptive Cheating:
• Mean of Backoff: In both [11] and [15] , if the actual backoff B act is less than an expected backoff T hresh (T hresh = λB exp ) during a monitoring period T , the Tx will be judged as "misbehaving", where λ is a configurable parameter that is selected according to the desired correct diagnosis ratio and mis-diagnosis ratio. However, a selfish node can adaptively choose
For instance, a node can select different sequence of cw to achieve this goal, e.g., 0, 0, 0, ..., CW . This exploits the fact that an alarm will never be issued until at the end of each monitoring interval T . If detection parameters such as T and T hresh are not easy to guess, a node can still defeat the detection mechanisms by using inter-changeable cw sequence, e.g., 0, CW , 0, CW , ..., 0, CW or 2, 4, 23, 7, 0. Hence, an attacker can access the channel more frequently than well-behaved nodes while hiding from the detection systems by always keeping the mean value of the backoff intervals above the threshold. In addition, a selfish node that intends to conserve its device energy may always choose larger cw, therefore B act will be always larger than T hresh. Hence, the current detection systems cannot detect or diagnosis such a misbehavior.
• Cross Flows: When a selfish node has crossing flows, i.e., flows that are traversing through itself, it can carry out another tricky strategy. In Fig. 3 , there are two flows: 5 . Selfish node B can selectively use a smaller cw 2 (cw 2 cw exp ) for its own flow f 2 and a larger cw 1 (cw 1 cw exp ) for other traffic, i.e., f 1. Accordingly, B can have more chance to unfairly access D and cheat the detection system deployed at node D because the mean value of 5 The solid lines in the figure represent physical connections between nodes. There can be more flows in the network, e.g.,
where cw exp is the value used by D to calculate B exp , N 1 is the number of packets for flow f 1 and N 2 is the number of packets for flow f 2 . This scenario is very common in ad hoc networks because each node can play the role of a router and a source at the same time. A selfish node can achieve three goals from this attack: 1) obtain unfair share of bandwidth; 2) conserve its limited device energy; 3) avoid easy detection.
• Versatile Attacker: In [15] , DOMINO passively overhears the transmission to collect necessary statistical data during each monitoring period T and runs the six tests consecutively at the end of each T . An alarm will be issued, i.e., to indicate the discovery of a "misbehaving" node, only if one of these tests fails. A smart attacker can adaptively cheat the detection system by switching frequently between different techniques and reducing the percentage of deviation to avoid detection. Note that it is not necessary for an attacker to know the accurate value of T , a reasonable switch rate between all the selfish techniques with less misbehavior magnitude, i.e., not deviating from the standard too much, can successfully allow the cheater to acquire more bandwidth than wellbehaved nodes while evading from the detection system. 3) Interlayer Attack: A single selfish node can target ad hoc on-demand routing mechanisms to conserve limited device energy by manipulating very few times its cw. For example, in dynamic source routing (DSR) [3] the destination replies to all the received route requests (RREQ) and the source will most likely use the route reply (RREP) message that arrives first. However, a node unwilling to forward packets for other nodes can delay the transmission of RREP, e.g., by choosing a very large cw to allow route replies forwarded by other nodes (possibly on longer routes) to arrive at the source first. Therefore, the selfish node will avoid being selected as a forwarding node. The same method can be applied to defeat another popular on-demand routing protocol ad hoc on-demand distance vector protocol (AODV) [14] where a node needs to delay the RREQ as the destination answers only the first received RREQ and discards the rest. Unlike previous attacks which require a node to change cw frequently, in this case a node can misbehave only once, by manipulating cw, upon the transmission of a routing message and wellbehave for the rest of the time. Clearly, detection systems proposed in [11] , [12] , [15] can not detect this kind of selfish misbehavior. A node is not necessary to know the exact type of received packet at MAC layer. Since RREQ is broadcast packet, a node can simply manipulate cw when it receives a packet which address is broadcast. Similar strategy can be applied to disrupt the network performance in case that QoS is required, e.g., delaying high priority flows that require less delay.
Moreover, a node can apply several strategies presented above to achieve selfish goals. For example, a node with no cross flows can implement interlayer attack to attract flows first, then use the adaptive cheating techniques to get more IV. PROPOSED SCHEME As mentioned in Section III, in IEEE 802.11, a selfish node can adaptively select cw to achieve a selfish goal, such as obtaining more bandwidth or conserving more energy, and avoid being detected. Our proposed algorithm is designed to require minimal modifications to IEEE 802.11 DCF mode, and mitigate the negative impacts in the presence of misbehaved nodes that manipulate the selection of cw to achieve selfish goals. In this section, we first overview the mechanism of IEEE 802.11 BEB. Second, we present our scheme PRB based on modifications of BEB. Finally, we explain how to incorporate PRB into IEEE 802.11 and the existing detection systems to mitigate and detect selfish MAC layer misbehavior.
A. Overview of BEB
The IEEE 802.11 random access protocol works as follows. A station with data packets to transmit chooses a random backoff value and counts down this value when the channel is sensed idle. When the channel is sensed busy, the counter remains frozen. The algorithm used for backoff is called Binary Exponential Backoff (BEB). As illustrated in Fig. 4(a) , the backoff value cw is initially randomly selected from the range [0, CW min ], where CW = CW min = 2 imin − 1 and cw = rand()%CW min . CW is doubled if the transmitted packet fails (indicated by the pre-set timeout timer expires [1] , [7] ), e.g., due to collisions or experiencing CRC errors. CW keeps on increasing until reaching the upper bound CW max , where CW max = 2 imax − 1. Each time a packet transmission is successful, CW is reset to CW min .
B. Illustration of PRB
Objective: Predictable Random Backoff (PRB) algorithm is random and "predictable". In this way, no matter what kind of attack strategies a selfish node may apply to manipulate the selection of cw (as mentioned in III-B), it will only lead to two consequences:
• if the selfish node follows PRB, the negative impact it has on the network performance will be mitigated regardless of the attack strategies; • if the selfish node does not follow PRB, since the backoff selection is predictable, the receiver can easily detect the misbehavior of the transmitter with direct evidence and perform immediate punishment (as discussed in IV-C). Illustration: As shown in Fig. 4(b) 
C. Detection and Reaction based on PRB
In this section, we explain the detection and reaction procedure based on PRB. To eliminate the exploits introduced by untrusted partners, the role of a receiver is only to detect a selfish transmitter.
First, we consider a selfish node that only aims at obtaining higher throughput by choosing smaller cw. A Rx can compute B i act for each received frame by using the methods described in [11] , [15] . The condition B i act < B i lb is a direct evidence 6 Note that the default value of CW lb is set to CW def lb = 0.
to identify a misbehaved Tx, where B i lb is the lower bound backoff computed based on cw i lb . Unlike [11] , [15] , there is no need for λ to ensure correct detection, because the value of CW i lb is deterministic and can be easily calculated by the Rx through monitoring the transmissions of Tx. As a consequence, the detection procedure is simple and accurate. Note that choosing B i act ≥ B i lb is not sufficient to indicate a well-behaved Tx. However, even a selfish Tx tries to keep on selecting small cw by applying the strategies we described in Section III, as long as it follows PRB, i.e., choosing cw i larger than CW i lb , the negative impacts will be significantly mitigated by PRB as shown in Section V. The same detection methods can be applied to detect a selfish node that selects a larger cw in order to reduce power consumption. This requires modifications to the PRB by introducing an upper bound CW ub . In this way, a node that keeps on choosing larger cw will be identified if B i act > B i ub . Moreover, as the detection is based on per-frame monitoring, it is faster than [11] , [15] . The measurement of the computational overhead of this mechanism will be left to our future work.
Upon identification of selfish nodes, the Rx can deny the traffic transmitted by the Tx to punish the selfish behavior. However, a node using interlayer attack strategy might be able to escape from the new detection system because the attack requires to manipulate cw only once and it can intentionally choose cw between B lb and B ub .
V. SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS
We use ns2 [5] to evaluate the performance of our proposed algorithm PRB. Although PRB is efficient regardless of the attack strategies an attacker might apply, e.g., choosing smaller cw or larger cw, in the following discussion we only consider a selfish node that chooses smaller cw in order to improve its own throughput while deteriorating the performance of other well-behaved flows.
A. Simulation Setup
Simulation Scenario: The topology of this experiment is a ring network with one node at the center and the rest nodes uniformly distributed on the circle. The ring radius is 200m. All the nodes are fixed. The transmission range for each node is 250m and the carrier sense range is 550m. Each node on the circle is the source of a single data flow and the source of each flow has the center point as the destination. Though PRB is capable of mitigating the impact of multiple selfish flows, here we only consider the case of a single selfish flow and multiple well-behaved flows to simplify the presentation of the results. The traffic type is constant bit rate (CBR). The packet size is 512 bytes/packet and the data rate is 200 packets/second for each flow. The channel bit rate is 2Mbps. The total time for each simulation run is 100 seconds.
To model the selfish misbehavior, we make a selfish source node always chooses a backoff cw from [0, γCW min ] 7 (γ ≥ 7 PRB is also efficient to mitigate other smart cw selection strategy as we explained in IV-B. For brevity, only naive attack strategy that a node always selects a smaller cw, i.e., 0 ≤ γ < 1, is discussed in this section. Simulation Metrics: We use the following metrics to study the performance of our proposed approach:
• Normalized Throughput: the ratio of the data packets successfully delivered to the destination for each flow to those generated by the source; • Average Packet Delay: the average end-to-end delay for each successfully delivered data packet, which includes all the possible delays caused by route buffering, MAC interface queue, retransmission delays.
• System Fairness: Jain's fairness index [10] is given by:
where N is the number of flows and T i is the throughput of a flow i. F J is equal to 1 when all the flows equally share the channel capacity, and is equal to 1/N when a single flow occupies the full bandwidth.
B. Results and Analysis
In this section, we evaluate the efficiency of our proposed algorithm PRB in mitigating the negative effects of MAC layer selfish misbehavior; specifically, the manipulation of cw. We compare the performance of BEB and PRB based on two different scenarios: 1) no attack; 2) attack.
Normalized Throughput and Average Delay (no attack case): Fig. 5 plots the normalized network throughput for BEB (designated as "BEB") and PRB (designated as "PRB") algorithms. It is clear that they have similar network throughput. In PRB, CW lb is used to prevent a node from selecting smaller cw upon successful transmission; whereas a well-behaved node will have little chance to continuously choose smaller cw by accident. The figure clearly shows a comparable network throughput between BEB and PRB under the no attack scenario. Moreover, as the number of flows increases, there is a rapid decrease in the normalized throughput. This is because more collisions will happen as the network environment becomes more congested, i.e., when more data flows join the network. The same conclusion can be drawn from Fig. 6 as well which shows the average packet delay for both BEB and PRB. Fairness Index (no attack case): Fig. 7 compares the fairness index of BEB and PRB for varying number of flows. The fairness indice of PRB and BEB are comparable when the traffic load is relatively low, e.g., index equals to 0.99 for 6 flows. As the number of flows increases, the fairness index of PRB is slightly better than BEB. This indicates that PRB achieves better fairness in a congested environment. It is because, in PRB, upon a successful frame transmission cw is selected from [CW lb , CW min ] instead of [0, CW min ], which means a node will have a smaller chance to choose a smaller cw, and therefore allowing other deferring nodes to have more opportunity to contend for the channel.
Instantaneous Throughput (attack case): Fig. 8 shows the comparison of instantaneous throughput (averaged over one second interval) between BEB and PRB for 4-flow case, where γ = 0.225 corresponds to CW min = 7. For brevity, we only plot one well-behaved flow whereas the other two has the same throughput. As shown in Fig. 8 , in BEB the throughput of a selfish flow and a well-behaved flow are 800 kbps and 150 kbps respectively. However, in PRB, the throughput for the selfish flow has dropped 50%, i.e., 400 kbps whereas the Fairness Index (attack case): Fig. 9 compares the fairness index between BEB and PRB for 2-flow, 4-flow and 20-flow scenarios. Similar to the results discussed above, PRB outperforms BEB in the presence of a selfish flow and as Fig. 9 shows it can ensure a much better fair share of the channel bandwidth when the traffic load becomes higher. Therefore, PRB is capable of mitigating the negative impacts caused by the selfish nodes especially in a congested environment.
Normalized Throughput (attack case): Fig. 10 compares the throughput 8 obtained by a selfish flow (designated as "M") using our proposed PRB with that obtained using IEEE 802.11 BEB for 4-flow and 20-flow scenarios. As seen from Fig. 10 , it also show the throughput obtained by the well-behaved flows (designated as "W") when using both schemes. A fair share of the channel bandwidth is defined as the throughput when a node uses IEEE 802.11 and completely follows its specifications, i.e., a node will have less advantage to access the channel than other nodes. As seen from figure, when γ = 1 (no attack), for 4-flow and 20-flow cases each flow shares 25% and 5% channel capacity respectively. However, in BEB, the throughput for the selfish flow increases rapidly as its 8 Note that here we re-define normalized throughput as
, where N is the number of flows and T i is the throughput of a flow i. misbehavior gets more intense. For example, when γ = 0.03 a selfish node can get nearly 70% of the total system throughput for 4-flow scenario as shown in Fig. 10(a) . This is at the cost of severely throughput degradation of well-behaved nodes, i.e., each flow can only obtain 10% system throughput. On the other hand, in PRB, the throughput of the selfish flow has decreased 18% even if it always chooses CW min = 1 (γ = 0.03). Furthermore, PRB achieves better performance than BEB especially in a congested environment, e.g., 20 flows, as shown in Fig. 10(b) . Clearly, we can see that the throughput of a selfish flow has decreased 74% whereas the throughput for each well-behaved flow has improved 170% (γ = 0.03). Hence, the proposed algorithm is fairly efficient in ensuring reasonable throughput for well-behaved nodes in the presence of selfish flows.
VI. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
Handling MAC layer selfish misbehavior is a fundamental requirement to ensure normal network operation of wellbehaved nodes in ad hoc networks. Several detection and reaction approaches have been proposed already, however, they could be exploited by some "smart" attackers. In this paper, we first analyzed several selfish attack strategies in MAC layer that can avoid to be detected by the existing detection systems. Then we present PRB, an algorithm based on modifications of BEB in IEEE 802.11 to mitigate the selfish MAC misbehavior, more specifically, the manipulation of the selection of backoff interval. Our simulation results have indicated that PRB outperforms BEB in the presence of MAC layer selfish misbehavior especially in a congested network environment.
For future work, we consider to develop an analytical model and explore the relationship between the network performance and PRB parameters, such as α l and CW thresh . We have explained how to incorporate PRB into IEEE 802.11 and the current detection systems to efficiently mitigate the negative impacts and make the detection procedure easier and faster. Detailed experimental results and theoretical analysis will be provided in the future. It is also worth noting that PRB has shown similar performance to BEB in case of no attack (but higher fairness index in high traffic load scenario), we plan to further compare their performance with and without attack in terms of mobility, network size and traffic type.
